LIVESTOCK PROGRAMME AND FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN

Food security and food economy

by

Tim Fison

INTRODUCTION

What do the terms food security and food economy actually mean? Are they used interchangeably or just overlap a good deal? I have a fair idea of what they are about but difficult to define. Huge amount of information generated about them and probably many academic courses available. Save the Children Fund (SCF) has been a leader in this field and has produced much literature. SCF seconded food security people to World Food Programme (WFP) to try to influence their approach to dropping food into South Sudan.

Food security: does this term refer to the state of mind of the people concerned or to a perception of those trying to help? It is a very subjective, rather vague concept. Does it imply prospects of food for next meal, whole day, next

day, week, month or year? At what nutritional level? Is it a general feeling of confidence about the future?

Food economy: more objective, can be studied and figures produced. The term seems to deal with more physical things, which can be measured or assessed. Can be considered at various levels e.g. region, country, district or household level. It involves a study of the kinds of food available, either locally produced or imported at an area level by traders or national level by governments. What proportion of the diet is contributed by each type of food: pie charts showing this are much used by food economists. Loss of body weight seems never to be taken into account in the yearly balance sheet of survival. What factors are impinging on the supply of each type and how do these vary according to seasons or other cycles of events? How do the proportions vary between years and seasonally. Whole range of considerations, whole livelihood and way of life

needs to be understood.

BACKGROUND OF SOUTH SUDAN

Huge flat area of the central Nile flood plain and rivers draining into the Nile system. Mountainous areas surrounding this to east and south and south west. The flood

Plain is used extensively for livestock rearing, which has to be geared into the ecology. Other areas cultivated extensively: fruit, sorghum, maize, tea potential,

groundnuts, cowpeas. A rich variety of people (for example the Taposa, Didinga, Bari, Zande, Jur) inhabit this ironstone shield around the borders of the country.

In contrast, the flood plain is a land of open and wooded grassland, mud, fire, insects, fish and remarkable flatness and occupied mainly by the Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk people. Extensive flooding in the wet season makes movement difficult. The water progressively shrinks down to the main rivers during the dry season and much old grass is burnt. Most cattle make transhumant movements following the receding floods, kinship groups combine their cattle into camps of up to several thousand and move together progressively from the villages during the dry season. Traditional sites

are used as they migrate. At the homesteads the cattle are kept in large thatched, domed structures called luaks or in small groups nearby. There is a continual juggling of animals between homesteads and cattle camps to keep old people and young children supplied with milk or fulfil marriages or other social obligations. Sheep tend to move with the cattle while goats tend to stay around villages on the higher ground where there are trees. There are infinite variations on this general pattern.

Wildlife also follow a similar movement: there are two species which migrate on a large scale (to the extent, at least up till a few years ago, of rivalling the migrations in the Serengeti): these are the tiang (Damaliscus lunatus tiang) and white eared kob (Kobus kob leucotis).

Historically, the south has been exploited for slaves and ivory from the north and hence there is a general feeling of distrust towards northerners. Sudan was ruled under the Ottoman empire and then under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The latter exercised the so-called southern policy to protect the south from Islam and Arabisation. Independence came in 1956 with insufficient provision being made for southern interests. Almost immediately a civil war began, which only ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa agreement between president Nimeiri and the southerners. Regional autonomy granted to the south and vice president of all Sudan was a Dinka. In 1982, the South was split disastrously into 3 regions. Then came the imposition of Sharia law and the beginning of the oil field development and the construction of the Jonglei canal. A second period of civil war began in 1983 and continues to the present time. A fatal split between the Nuer and Dinka occurred in 1991 and lead to the loss of many towns to northern control. A punitive Nuer raid on Bor county left the Dinka there destitute and without livestock and cause much lasting resentment. There are now many factions in the South and the Khartoum Government exploits these. Some of the factors which fuel the war are: religion (there is a great revival of Christianity amoungst southerners), history, culture, resources (oil, water, minerals, grazing and livestock and agricultural potential). Slavery still goes on.

Some southern Sudanese still refer back to Old Testament in which there is a reference to south Sudan and it is still quoted as an explanation for their never ending problems. There are also more recent prophets of the Nuer whose words are still taken as truth.

FOOD ECONOMY IN SOUTH SUDAN

Why should there be food insecurity? It is, after all, a huge country and relatively few people.

The main internal food resources are: sorghum, maize and millet as staple carbohydrates, the main pulses are cow peas and some beans, with groundnuts also being important in some areas. Only few vegetables are grown: tomatoes, pumpkins and onions. Oil seeds: sesame and shea butter. Wild plant foods are very important and varied with examples such as Balanites sp. amaranthus, Portulaca sp. Borassus palm, various grasses and water lily seeds and tubers. Wild food plants in south Sudan have been the subject of a major study. The principal wild mammals used for

food are the tiang and kob but the widespread use of automatic weapons has led to their decline. Wild birds are not often used but there is a huge potential eg the spurwing goose. Fish comprise a very large resource: catfish, Nile perch, tilapia,

Heterotis and many others. Domestic animal products: milk, mainly of cattle but also goats and sometimes sheep, meat of cattle, sheep and goats. Some eggs and poultry meat are also consumed. Blood is harvested mainly from cattle.

Extensive surveys have been done in south Sudan in an effort to quantify (in the form of pie charts) the various components of the food economy at different seasons, in different years and for different social groups.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FOOD INSECURITY

War (not only between north and south but between southern factions too)

Weather

Human disease

Animal disease

Lack of infrastructure

Terrain

Insects and parasites

How do the above affect food security?

War: takes men for fighting so fewer available for cultivation and leaving female

headed households

causes displacement so interrruptions to cultivation and harvest

people lose the will or confidence to cultivate

crops get burnt in the field or stolen from storage

markets disrupted

livestock are looted

general breakdown of society and loss of property

interruptions of grazing and cattle movements

insecurity, or fear of it, interferes with development programmes

Weather: inconsistent rainfall, total amount and distribution

recurring floods and drought, with much local variation, cropping

always uncertain.

Terrain: the flatness makes drainage difficult and many places become a sea of mud

in the wet season , restricting movement and making roads difficult to

maintain.

Much clay soil, which is liable to set hard or become water logged, limiting

the period of easy cultivation either by hand, by oxen or by tractors.

Lack of infrastructure: roads are non existent or beyond repair, hardly any trucking

system, limited river navigation

no grain storage system

no stock routes or slaughter slabs

lack of basic amenities

no government services

no market structures

Human disease: affect on labour for cultivation eg guinea worm, kala azar, TB,

brucellosis, malaria, gut worms, relapsing fever,

schistosomiasis and malnutrition.

Animal disease: lowering productivity eg CBPP, internal parasites,

trypanosomosis, brucellosis, TB, HS, anthrax, blackquarter,

malnutrition

Insects and parasites: the ecology promotes huge parasite transmission eg liver

fluke, amphistomes, schistosomiasis, guinea worm, and gut

nematodes.

Nuisance effect and disease transmission potential of flies on

people and animals: house flies, Stomoxys, mosquitoes,

Tabanidae and Hippoboscidae.

OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

Began in 1989, with UNICEF and WFP mainly supplying grain and relief supplies, based out of Lokichoggio in northern Kenya. Tripartite agreement between GOS,

OLS and SRRA and RASS. Now it comprises a consortium of some 30 NGOs with UNICEF and WFP at the head. All squashed into a camp of several hectares with razor wire all around. Social consequences for the local Turkana: large influx of foreign Kenyans as well as expatriates. WFP doing mostly supplies of maize, sorghum, oil and other feeds by lorry and planes (Hercules, Buffalos and Antanovs). UNICEF play a coordinating role in human health, animal health, education, water, fisheries etc. OLS is split into different sectors, of which household food security was one: animal health came fairly and squarely in there along with fisheries, seeds and tools, ox ploughing and seed swapping! Huge emphasis on household

food security: recurrent theme of many meetings and numerous surveys and assessments: WFP food monitors doing endless bean piling on crop yields, wealth ranking, and sources of food from year to year in different localities. Large database compiled. Particular emphasis on wild plant foods.

LIVESTOCK PROGRAMME

Initially, only UNICEF was involved and the focus was on rinderpest eradication. A very successful programme of vaccination was carried out with the number of confirmed outbreaks reducing from 11in 1993 to one in 1995 and one in 1998. In 1992-3, UNICEF encouraged NGOs to come in to broaden the livestock work. Now there are about 10 NGOs doing livestock work and the the area is parcelled out to avoid duplication and squabbling!

A common approach, rather dictated by UNICEF, has been adopted: a decentralised, privatised, community based and sustainable (catch jargon words) animal health programme has been attempted. Cost recovery has been an essential feature. Basic strategy comprises an initial assessment of needs and problems followed by community meetings to explain programme. Chiefs and other

community leaders are asked to organise the selection of people for training as community animal health workers. A short crash training course of 10-14 days is carried out, following which equipment and medicines are issued. The CAHWs are then sent off to begin their work.

Periodically, the CAHWs report back bringing treatment records, remaining drugs and cost recovery. They are given 20% of the cost recovery and the rest is kept, pending a decision to use it on some communal project. More drugs supplied on basis of treatment records and the amount of cost recovery brought.

Initially, UNICEF organised the rinderpest vaccination campaign as a separate exercise. Later, rinderpest vaccination was included (at the insistence of

UNICEF) in the work of the CAHWs.

Main diseases addressed:

CATTLE

Vaccinations rinderpest

HS

Anthrax

BQ

CBPP

Treatments trypanosomosis

Liver fluke

Gut nematodes (especially Haemonchus

contortus)

CBPP

HS, BQ, anthrax

Eye infections

Lice

Ticks

GOATS and SHEEP

Vaccinations anthrax

RP for PPR

Treatments Gut nematodes

Mange

Pneumonia (including CCPP)

Pox

Lice and fleas

Ticks

CHICKENS External parasites

Drugs used: heat stable RP vaccine, albendazole (Vermitan, Tramazole), oxytetracycline 20% LA, ivermectin (Cevamec), oxytetracycline eye powder, louse

powder, tick grease.

Recording system: each CAHW carries separate sheets for the main diseases and there are circles to cross off for various age categories treated. These are submitted to district supervisor who compiles a summary on another sheet for each CAHW. The latter are then sent to the relevant NGO.

Disease investigation: a small diagnostic lab was established in Lokichoggio and the main investigations were into brucellosis, trypanosomosis, internal parasites, skin diseases and tuberculosis.

How successful has the livestock programme been?

It was considered to be one of the better sectors within OLS. There has been strong coordination and direction from UNICEF, with considerable influence from Tuft's University. It has been perhaps too top down.

Privatisation: the ultimate aim is to have private traders bringing in drugs and

selling them to CAHWs. It was not clear where the professional

veterinary input would come in? This may be possible near

Uganda or Kenya but is very difficult in many areas remote

from borders and dependent on plane supplies. Linked with

cattle trade.

Decentralised: this was achieved to some extent. The CAHWs were out and

about but there is still tendency to hover around airstrips and

CAHWs often see themselves as NGO people. Are they an

improvement on the old style veterinary scouts and stockmen?

Difficult to get away completely from some kind of structure,

in the sense of both physical centres or clinics and a personnel

hierarchy.

Community based: difficult to define community, especially in these times of

displacement and upheaval and with transhumant lifestyles.

Community is standard development jargon now. What

does it mean? More of a lineage question if equal

representation desired. Endeavoured to get selection of

CAHWs by broad consensus on the basis of one CAHW

for every two2 subchiefs. It was difficult to base CAHWs

in geographical areas because there is so much movement

of people and livestock. The actual selection was very

problematical. It was difficult to get the idea across that

CAHWs are answerable to their own people and to give

complete control over to chiefs and community leaders.

Attempts were made to set up Veterinary Coordination

Committees which were supposed to control cost recovery,

settle disputes and generally help organise the programme.

These met with varied success.

Sustainable: it was difficult to get away from the dependence on aircraft

for drugs supplies and logistics. The near impossibility of

exchanging Sudanese currency and the lack of an agreed

exchange rate were severe obstacles to sustainability.

DID THE PROGRAMME HAVE AN IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY?

It was often hailed as a great programme but it was hard to demonstrate the impact let alone measure it. One obvious success has been the virtual end of rinderpest: it still

often heads disease ranking lists but this reflects fear of it rather than its current effects. Stephen Blakeway attempted to quantify the result of controlling rinderpest in south Sudan. He worked out that it was 15 times as cost effective in terms of increased milk production as flying in grain. There is little doubt about the benefits of control of rinderpest.

What about other inputs: can one claim an impact from numbers of treatments achieved? Main causes of loss of condition and productivity are: trypansomosis, fasciolosis, haemonchosis, energy and protein deficiency, age and repeated pregnancies, chronic CBPP, TB, schistosomosis, mineral deficiencies, distance to water and grazing, biting fly stress and ticks. Not all of these were addressed by the programme.

Vaccinations for HS, BQ and anthrax

These were not done consistently or on a large scale and it is difficult to quantify changes in prevalence of sporadic diseases.

Vaccination for CBPP: this was unlikely to have had a large impact because firstly, there was doubt about the efficacy of the vaccine and, secondly, only a low coverage

was achieved.

Trypanosomosis treatment: there was no strategic herd dosing and no vector control, so individual treatments were unlikely to affect prevalence. Once an animal has reached the chronic stage it is more difficult to cure. There is probably a fair amount of tolerance to trypanosomes in south Sudan and perhaps even finding a few in the blood might not mean they are causing disease.

Dosing for liver fluke: this is assumed to be beneficial but without strategic dosing or any possibility of grazing control, there must be some doubt about the effect of a one-off dose of anthelmintic. In the case of chronic infections acquired over time, one wonders whether removing the existing parasite load merely opens the way for reinfection. Sewell showed individual variation in response to infection but always ‘insidious wasting and progressive anaemia'. He found that one fluke reduced annual liveweight gain by 200g so an average infestation of perhaps 200 flukes, this means a potential loss of 40kg. But what would it mean in an adult animal with a chronic, stable infection and seasonally, fluctuating body weight?

Dosing for intestinal worms: the evidence for benefit of deworming is well documented and accepted wisdom in many situations. However, GTZ in Somalia found it difficult to show any effect on weight gain in goats in Somalia and an earlier study in south Sudan found no demonstrable effect of anthelmintic dosing in young, growing cattle. Many animals probably have low, non-pathogenic burdens which may be uneconomic to treat. Perhaps giving individual treatments to affected animals is a reasonable approach in low producing livestock. The author came across one cattle camp where the calves in general were thin and diarrhoeic and faecal samples showed high egg counts. In this instance, a herd treatment, certainly of the young stock would probably have been beneficial but the policy of insisting on payment precluded it. On the other hand, perhaps the animals would have self-cured and then shown compensatory growth.

Treatment for CBPP: some experts say it is immoral or at least counter productive to treat cases of CBPP on the grounds that it promotes the carrier state. But firm evidence for this is lacking and, in any case, refusing to treat affected cattle in south Sudan is not an option. But who has checked on the effect of a single injection of oxytetracycline on a chronic case of CBPP? CAHWs claimed great success but this was hard to believe and the author never managed to follow up a case.

Treatment of HS, anthrax and BQ: the sudden onset of these diseases make successful treatment difficult but again great success was claimed by the CAHWs. Perhaps the diagnosis was uncertain in early stages! There was no quantification of treatment successes.

Treatment of external parasites: infestations of lice in calves and fleas in kids and lambs were common and sometimes heavy. Treatments must have produced benefits in terms of animal welfare and perhaps in productivity too. Feather lice never seemed a big problem and the louse powder was probably not very effective against mites and ticks. The programme therefore had little impact on poultry production.

MEASUREMENT OF IMPACT

There was a great deal of discussion about this, both within the whole OLS livestock programme and amongst programme staff in SCF.

1 Participatory assessment

This is perhaps the only possible way under current conditions in South Sudan. Veterinaires sans Frontieres (Switzerland) did it and found a perception of large

benefit from their programme. The auther tried it in one area for the SCF programme

and found quite the reverse: the participants felt there was more disease and less milk after several years of the programme!

For donors, a positive participatory assessment may be sufficient but what is reality? Do people tell you what they think you want to hear or what they think will produce a suitable response? Is what they think correct anyway? Is it enough to know that people think the programme is all right? It is not easy to carry it out in a controlled way with different people in different situations to enable meaningful comparisons to be made.

2 Measure effect on milk offtake

This should be the most obvious and relevant indicator as far as food security goes. But in practice it is quite difficult! For example, there is a seasonal effect on milk yield: several studies have shown a near doubling of milk offtake in the wet season compared with the dry. So the difficulty is to keep other factors such as nutrition constant while measuring the affect of treatment. There are also practical difficulties in carrying out the measurement. Gourds are often used with a tiny hole at top so just getting the milk into a suitable container for weighing (froth makes problems for volume measurement) and back again poses a difficulty, especially if the milk has begun to clot! Women and girls are in control at milking and they tend to be a bit secretive about the handling of the milk. The milkers have to be persuaded to bring the milk straight from the cow to a central spot for weighing and recording the name of the cow and her calf. It is often dark when the evening milking is done and there may be mud, rain and mosquitoes to contend with. Ideally, offtake from the same cows would have to be done for several days running because the amount taken varies according to the whim of the milker. To show the effect of treatment with, say, Ethidium, this would have to be done before and after treatment and the owners would have to be persuaded not to move the animals during that time.

Another approach might be to estimate the milk consumed by children, for example by finding out how many have to share the milk from a group of cows, whose offtake has been measured.

It may be that, given the other constraints such as genetic potential and nutrition, the increase in production following disease treatment in individual animals may be limited. Consultants from Farm Africa, who came to evaluate the SCF programme thought that the potential for increasing food security through improvements in cultivation was much greater than increasing livestock production!

3 Measure effect on growth rates

There are problems with measuring this parameter also. It is difficult to ensure regular access to the animals and seasonal fluctuations in weight are likely to occur with varying pasture quality and quantity. An earlier study in south Sudan showed that the growth of young stock stopped completely for several months in the dry season and the weight of adult animals varied by about 4% during the year. Measuring growth rates in controlled and regularly treated animals would introduce different circumstances from those herded normally.

4 Measure effect on mortality

This is difficult to do without written records and identification of animals. Progeny history taking might be a way around this problem. Individual cows are 'interviewed' with the owner: the fate of each of her calves is noted in turn and a picture of mortality and disease prevalence is built up. With careful questioning, it might be possible to compare the calf mortality during the period for which the programme has been running, with earlier years.

A livestock census (either by objective counting by observers or by participative techniques) might show and increase in herd size. This might, however, reflect circumstances other than changes in mortality.

5 Measure amount of blood consumed

The taking of blood for human consumption is done covertly by the Nuer and Dinka and there might be difficulties in arranging access.

6 Measure amount of meat eaten

On the whole cattle are not slaughtered for meat. An increase in consumption might indicate a state of desperation rather than a greater number of animals available for slaughter.

7 Measure disease reduction

Good baseline information at the start of the programme and detailed surveillance thereafter. Figures or opinions obtained by participatory techniques might be acceptable.

8 Measure fertility

This might be done by analysis of herd structures or by careful progeny history taking to work out such parameters as the average number of calves per cow and calving intervals.

9 Measure some indirect effects of the programme

Examples of these might be the value of animals in markets and the number being sold and the average size of bridewealth.

10 Document programme outputs instead of impact

Examples of these might be the following:

No. of CAHWs trained

No. still working after certain period

No. of refresher courses given

Knowledge retained by CAHWs

Standard of work of CAHWs

No. of vaccinations and treatments given

Amount of drugs supplied

Amount of cost recovery received and community projects resulting

from its use

We should question whether there is a need to measure the impact or cost benefit of a programme. Are the donors really insisting on this or is it the perception of the NGOs? It might be sufficient to make a considered judgement of the likelihood of there being benefits and just get on with it! It must be remembered that livestock are not only used for food. There are other justifications for working with animals: the whole social fabric depends on them, they are the basis for a welfare system and children relate to them almost like pets.

Other spin-offs from the programme are as follows:

Gaining ethnoveterinary knowledge

Training remains

Knowledge generally about livestock in south Sudan

Livestock and education

Livestock and human health eg TB and brucellosis

Facilitating other programme sectors.

Conclusion

The author is not discrediting the community animal health approach, indeed he is am firm believer in bringing local people in and using their knowledge. But sometimes exaggerated claims seem to be made about them: there are problems and one has to ask whether there are examples where CAHWs are operating without external input? What about the standards of treatment? Where do professional vets fit in?

In terms of food security, there probably would there have been a greater impact had we abolished or modified the cost recovery system. We could then have been more proactive in giving treatments. Payment of the CAHWs might have produced a greater output. There were also questions about the competence of the CAHWs, given that they received crash courses in which they had to learn doses, prices, vaccination, recording, giving injections and drenches, signs of different diseases and the cost recovery system. They needed frequent and regular follow up and refresher courses but this was difficult to achieve in practice.

On balance were we just making people happy or did the programme really helping their nutrition status? It was certainly a popular programme and generally seen to be helpful. A very successful programme from an organisational point of view might not necessarily have a commensurate impact on food security.

One feels it must be a morale boost for pastoral people in the difficult circumstances prevailing in south Sudan to receive help for their most important asset. Children with access to cattle certainly were noticeably better physically and more cheerful than children without.

The programme concentrated entirely on drugs and vaccines. This is the easy and popular and visible way of helping pastoralists but perhaps of limited value when genetic potential or nutrition impose further ceilings on productivity. Need to know how much Nilotic animals would produce without disease and with optimal nutrition.

Perhaps animal production people should have been used more!

Was it sustainable? Elaborate claims made about this but hardly relevant in south Sudan.

The programme was fully justified on grounds quite apart from those of immediate household food security enhancement. Veterinary work is always said to be the art of the possible: in South Sudan this is particularly the case.